When people first encounter the MA (Memory Activation) Theory of Mind/Brain, they are often surprised by the terminology. That is, I don’t use any special terms to describe the mind. Of course I use neuroscience terms such as “neurons,” “functional neural networks,” “large scale neural activity,” etc. But in describing the mind I simply use everyday words: memory, experience, thought, feeling, goals, attention, intention etc. I seldom use brain science terms such as “phenomenology,” “neurocognitive networks,” “semantic memory,” or “executive control.”
Why not? Because, like any paradigm-shifting theory, the MA Theory is based on an entirely new set of philosophical assumptions. This new paradigm is the foundation of an original model of brain mechanics: the MA Method.
The MA Theory and cognitive neuroscience are two separate paradigms. Using cognitive neuroscience terms distorts the meaning of the MA Theory.
For example, the MA Theory asserts the mind = (mostly) a set of general memories, based on past experience. For example, the thoughts “I recognize that object as an apple, it’s a nutritious snack, I want to reach for it are all memories (comprised of sub-memories).
Therefore, if the MA Theory were to use “neurocognitive networks” this would not fit the MA Theory. The proper terms are “general memories” or “memories based on past experience.”
Since my brain theory is based on an entirely new view of the mind, old terminology won’t work. New terms — in this case, everyday language — are required to paint a new picture of how the mind/brain system works.